Spontaneous and deliberate future thinking: A dual process account

© 2019 Springer Nature.This is the final published version of an article published in Psychological Research, licensed under a Creative Commons Attri-bution 4.0 International License. Available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00426-019-01262-7.In this article, we address an apparent paradox in the literature on mental time travel and mind-wandering: How is it possible that future thinking is both constructive, yet often experienced as occurring spontaneously? We identify and describe two ‘routes’ whereby episodic future thoughts are brought to consciousness, with each of the ‘routes’ being associated with separable cognitive processes and functions. Voluntary future thinking relies on controlled, deliberate and slow cognitive processing. The other, termed involuntary or spontaneous future thinking, relies on automatic processes that allows ‘fully-fledged’ episodic future thoughts to freely come to mind, often triggered by internal or external cues. To unravel the paradox, we propose that the majority of spontaneous future thoughts are ‘pre-made’ (i.e., each spontaneous future thought is a re-iteration of a previously constructed future event), and therefore based on simple, well-understood, memory processes. We also propose that the pre-made hypothesis explains why spontaneous future thoughts occur rapidly, are similar to involuntary memories, and predominantly about upcoming tasks and goals. We also raise the possibility that spontaneous future thinking is the default mode of imagining the future. This dual process approach complements and extends standard theoretical approaches that emphasise constructive simulation, and outlines novel opportunities for researchers examining voluntary and spontaneous forms of future thinking.Peer reviewe

Your space or mine? : Mapping self in time

Peer reviewedPublisher PD

Why are we not flooded by involuntary thoughts about the past and future? Testing the cognitive inhibition dependency hypothesis

© The Author(s) 2018In everyday life, involuntary thoughts about future plans and events occur as often as involuntary thoughts about the past. However, compared to involuntary autobiographical memories (IAMs), such episodic involuntary future thoughts (IFTs) have become a focus of study only recently. The aim of the present investigation was to examine why we are not constantly flooded by IFTs and IAMs given that they are often triggered by incidental cues while performing undemanding activities. One possibility is that activated thoughts are suppressed by the inhibitory control mechanism, and therefore depleting inhibitory control should enhance the frequency of both IFTs and IAMs. We report an experiment with a between-subjects design, in which participants in the depleted inhibition condition performed a 60-min high-conflict Stroop task before completing a laboratory vigilance task measuring the frequency of IFTs and IAMs. Participants in the intact inhibition condition performed a version of the Stroop task that did not deplete inhibitory control. To control for physical and mental fatigue resulting from performing the 60-min Stroop tasks in experimental conditions, participants in the control condition completed only the vigilance task. Contrary to predictions, the number of IFTs and IAMs reported during the vigilance task, using the probe-caught method, did not differ across conditions. However, manipulation checks showed that participants’ inhibitory resources were reduced in the depleted inhibition condition, and participants were more tired in the experimental than in the control conditions. These initial findings suggest that neither inhibitory control nor physical and mental fatigue affect the frequency of IFTs and IAMs.Peer reviewedFinal Published versio

Effects of exposure to facial expression variation in face learning and recognition.

Facial expression is a major source of image variation in face images. Linking numerous expressions to the same face can be a huge challenge for face learning and recognition. It remains largely unknown what level of exposure to this image variation is critical for expression-invariant face recognition. We examined this issue in a recognition memory task, where the number of facial expressions of each face being exposed during a training session was manipulated. Faces were either trained with multiple expressions or a single expression, and they were later tested in either the same or different expressions. We found that recognition performance after learning three emotional expressions had no improvement over learning a single emotional expression (Experiments 1 and 2). However, learning three emotional expressions improved recognition compared to learning a single neutral expression (Experiment 3). These findings reveal both the limitation and the benefit of multiple exposures to variations of emotional expression in achieving expression-invariant face recognition. The transfer of expression training to a new type of expression is likely to depend on a relatively extensive level of training and a certain degree of variation across the types of expressions

Re-imagining the future:repetition decreases hippocampal involvement in future simulation

Imagining or simulating future events has been shown to activate the anterior right hippocampus (RHC) more than remembering past events does. One fundamental difference between simulation and memory is that imagining future scenarios requires a more extensive constructive process than remembering past experiences does. Indeed, studies in which this constructive element is reduced or eliminated by “pre-imagining” events in a prior session do not report differential RHC activity during simulation. In this fMRI study, we examined the effects of repeatedly simulating an event on neural activity. During scanning, participants imagined 60 future events; each event was simulated three times. Activation in the RHC showed a significant linear decrease across repetitions, as did other neural regions typically associated with simulation. Importantly, such decreases in activation could not be explained by non-specific linear time-dependent effects, with no reductions in activity evident for the control task across similar time intervals. Moreover, the anterior RHC exhibited significant functional connectivity with the whole-brain network during the first, but not second and third simulations of future events. There was also evidence of a linear increase in activity across repetitions in right ventral precuneus, right posterior cingulate and left anterior prefrontal cortex, which may reflect source recognition and retrieval of internally generated contextual details. Overall, our findings demonstrate that repeatedly imagining future events has a decremental effect on activation of the hippocampus and many other regions engaged by the initial construction of the simulation, possibly reflecting the decreasing novelty of simulations across repetitions, and therefore is an important consideration in the design of future studies examining simulation

Intertwining personal and reward relevance: evidence from the drift-diffusion model.

In their seminal paper 'Is our self nothing but reward', Northoff and Hayes (Biol Psychiatry 69(11):1019-1025, Northoff, Hayes, Biological Psychiatry 69(11):1019-1025, 2011) proposed three models of the relationship between self and reward and opened a continuing debate about how these different fields can be linked. To date, none of the proposed models received strong empirical support. The present study tested common and distinct effects of personal relevance and reward values by de-componenting different stages of perceptual decision making using a drift-diffusion approach. We employed a recently developed associative matching paradigm where participants (N = 40) formed mental associations between five geometric shapes and five labels referring personal relevance in the personal task, or five shape-label pairings with different reward values in the reward task and then performed a matching task by indicating whether a displayed shape-label pairing was correct or incorrect. We found that common effects of personal relevance and monetary reward were manifested in the facilitation of behavioural performance for high personal relevance and high reward value as socially important signals. The differential effects between personal and monetary relevance reflected non-decisional time in a perceptual decision process, and task-specific prioritization of stimuli. Our findings support the parallel processing model (Northoff & Hayes, Biol Psychiatry 69(11):1019-1025, Northoff, Hayes, Biological Psychiatry 69(11):1019-1025, 2011) and suggest that self-specific processing occurs in parallel with high reward processing. Limitations and further directions are discussed

Turning I into me: Imagining your future self.

A widely endorsed belief is that perceivers imagine their present selves using a different representational format than imagining their future selves (i.e., near future=first-person; distant future=third-person). But is this really the case? Responding to the paucity of work on this topic, here we considered how temporal distance influences the extent to which individuals direct their attention outward or inward during a brief imaginary episode. Using a non-verbal measure of visual perspective taking (i.e., letter-drawing task) our results confirmed the hypothesized relation between temporal distance and conceptions of the self. Whereas simulations of an event in the near future were dominated by a first-person representation of the self, this switched to a third-person depiction when the event was located in the distant future. Critically, this switch in vantage point was restricted to self-related simulations. The theoretical and practical implications of these findings are considered

Mind-wandering and alterations to default mode network connectivity when listening to naturalistic versus artificial sounds

Naturalistic environments have been demonstrated to promote relaxation and wellbeing. We assess opposing theoretical accounts for these effects through investigation of autonomic arousal and alterations of activation and functional connectivity within the default mode network (DMN) of the brain while participants listened to sounds from artificial and natural environments. We found no evidence for increased DMN activity in the naturalistic compared to artificial or control condition, however, seed based functional connectivity showed a shift from anterior to posterior midline functional coupling in the naturalistic condition. These changes were accompanied by an increase in peak high frequency heart rate variability, indicating an increase in parasympathetic activity in the naturalistic condition in line with the Stress Recovery Theory of nature exposure. Changes in heart rate and the peak high frequency were correlated with baseline functional connectivity within the DMN and baseline parasympathetic tone respectively, highlighting the importance of individual neural and autonomic differences in the response to nature exposure. Our findings may help explain reported health benefits of exposure to natural environments, through identification of alterations to autonomic activity and functional coupling within the DMN when listening to naturalistic sounds

Atypical Neurophysiology Underlying Episodic and Semantic Memory in Adults with Autism Spectrum Disorder

Individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) show atypicalities in episodic memory (Boucher et al. in Psychological Bulletin, 138 (3), 458-496, 2012). We asked participants to recall the colours of a set of studied line drawings (episodic judgement), or to recognize line drawings alone (semantic judgement). Cycowicz et al. (Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 65, 171-237, 2001) found early (300 ms onset) posterior old-new event-related potential effects for semantic judgements in typically developing (TD) individuals, and occipitally focused negativity (800 ms onset) for episodic judgements. Our results replicated findings in TD individuals and demonstrate attenuated early old-new effects in ASD. Late posterior negativity was present in the ASD group, but was not specific to this time window. This non-specificity may contribute to the atypical episodic memory judgements characteristic of individuals with ASD